At the end of the day, diplomacy may not be enough. The best explanation about why force has to remain an option comes from the IAEA director general Mohamed ElBaradei, who, on January 23, 2006, said "Diplomacy has to be backed up by pressure and, in extreme case, by force. We have rules. We have to do everything possible to uphold the rules through conviction. If not, then you impose them. Of course, this has to be the last resort, but sometimes you have to do it."
To be sure, preemptive military force would be a highly undesirable option—but it would be less undesirable than the alternative, which could be both nuclear weapons in the hands of ideological hard-liners bent on confrontation and a nuclear arms race across the Middle East.
That said, it would be premature to write off the prospects for a diplomatic resolution of the crisis. If the United States and its allies can effectively demonstrate that Iran is paying a high price for its confrontational stance, the cautious instincts of Khamene'i and many Iranian leaders could lead them to freeze the overt conversion and enrichment programs, regardless of Ahmadinejad's attitude. While Iran would almost certainly continue with covert activities, the need to keep those hidden would slow development. In this case, delay could be victory, because the long-term prospects for the Islamic Republic look poor: it has done a miserable job of winning the hearts and minds of young Iranians and, meanwhile, social and regional developments suggest more pressure for democratic governance.
To be sure, preemptive military force would be a highly undesirable option—but it would be less undesirable than the alternative, which could be both nuclear weapons in the hands of ideological hard-liners bent on confrontation and a nuclear arms race across the Middle East.
That said, it would be premature to write off the prospects for a diplomatic resolution of the crisis. If the United States and its allies can effectively demonstrate that Iran is paying a high price for its confrontational stance, the cautious instincts of Khamene'i and many Iranian leaders could lead them to freeze the overt conversion and enrichment programs, regardless of Ahmadinejad's attitude. While Iran would almost certainly continue with covert activities, the need to keep those hidden would slow development. In this case, delay could be victory, because the long-term prospects for the Islamic Republic look poor: it has done a miserable job of winning the hearts and minds of young Iranians and, meanwhile, social and regional developments suggest more pressure for democratic governance.
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